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Abstract 
This paper uses a gravity model to assess ex-post regional trade agreements. The model 
includes 130 countries and is estimated in panel over the period 1962-96. The 
introduction of the correct number of dummy variables allows for identification of 
Vinerian trade creation and trade diversion effects, while the estimation method takes 
into account a potential correlation between the explanatory variables and the bilateral 
specific effects introduced in the model, as well as potential selection bias. In contrast 
with previous estimates, results show that over the period 1962-1996, regional 
agreements have generated a significant increase in trade between members, often at the 
expense of the rest of the world.  
 
JEL Classification: F11; F15; C23. 
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Ce papier utilise un modèle de gravité pour évaluer ex-post des accords commerciaux 
régionaux. Le modèle est estimé en panel, sur 130 pays et sur la période 1962-96. 
L’introduction du nombre correct de variables muettes permet d’identifier les effets de 
création et de détournement de trafic vinérien, selon une méthode d’estimation qui 
prend en compte (i) la corrélation potentielle entre certaines variables explicatives et les 
effets spécifiques bilatéraux introduits dans le modèle, (ii) un biais de sélection 
potentiel. Contrairement aux estimations des études précédentes, les résultats mettent en 
évidence que sur la période 1962-1996, les accords régionaux considérés dans ce papier 
ont engendré une augmentation significative du commerce entre les pays membres, 
souvent au détriment du reste du monde.  
 
JEL Classification: F11; F15; C23. 
 
Mots-clé : Accords Commerciaux Régionaux, Equation de gravité, création de trafic, 
détournement de trafic, données de panel. 
  21. Introduction 
After a long period of neglect following its introduction in the late sixties (Poyhonen, 
1963, Tinbergen, 1962, Linnemann, 1966, Aitken, 1973) since the late eighties, the 
gravity trade model has acquired a second youth. First, it discovered new theoretical 
foundations both with the advent of the trade theories based on monopolistic 
competition and firm-level product differentiation which predict that the intensity of 
trade should be inversely related to GDP across trading partners (Krugman and 
Helpman, 1985, Feenstra, Markusen and Rose, 1998) and within a perfect competition 
setting with product differentiation at the national level (Deardorff, 1998). Second, the 
gravity model is used extensively to study trade patterns, as for example in the case of 
the drastic changes following the demise of central planning. Most recently, in the 
estimation of models of geography and trade, the gravity  model is, once again, holding 
center stage (Hummels, 2001, Redding and Venables, 2001, Limao and Venables, 
2001). In fact, the gravity model has also become a favored tool to assess ex-post the 
trade creating and trade diverting effects associated with preferential trading 
arrangements (Frankel, 1997, Soloaga and Winters, 2001).  
 
Along with this renewal in interest, questions have been raised about the proper 
formulation of the model (choice of variables) as well as about proper econometric 
techniques, especially when the usual cross-country formulation is amended to include a 
temporal dimension. Indeed, the discussion about the proper econometric specification 
of the gravity model has shown that the conventional cross-section formulation without 
the inclusion of country specific effects is misspecified and so introduces a bias in the 
assessment of the effects of regional agreements on bilateral trade (e.g., Matyas, 1997 
and Soloaga and Winters, 2001). However, it turns out that these specifications, with 
  3three specific effects (exporter, importer and time effects) is only a restricted version of 
a more general model which allows for country-pair heterogeneity (e.g., Cheng and 
Wall, 1999 and Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2000).  
 
In contrast to the traditional cross-section gravity model which includes time invariant 
trade impediment measures (e.g. distance, common language dummies, border, 
historical and cultural links as in Frankel, 1997), the more general proposed 
specification is more adequate since it accounts for any (unobserved) bilateral effect. 
Hence, all factors that influence bilateral trade which were partially captured by 
regional dummies are now controlled for.  
 
In this paper, I apply this more general specification and show that the predictions of the 
effects of regional trade agreements (RTA) in terms of trade creation and trade 
diversion are very different according to whether one uses a cross-section or a panel 
specification with random bilateral effects (fixed effects eliminating agreements that are 
time invariant). In this setting, the potential correlation of some explanatory variables 
with the country-pair effects has to be analyzed. I show that the use of the instrumental 
method proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) is necessary to avoid estimation bias. 
Moreover, the selection bias that can appear in an unbalanced sample is tested and 
corrected for by the inclusion of a selection rule in the model estimation (as in Guillotin 
and Sevestre, 1994). 
 
Section 2 presents the canonical gravity model with the modified cross-section version 
used for ex-post evaluations of regional agreements (with the three dummies mentioned 
above that have to be included for each RTA according to trade theories). Section 3 
  4specifies the alternative panel model with the characteristics proposed above. Finally, 
section 4 compares cross-section and panel estimates. To anticipate the main 
conclusion, it turns out that the panel estimates yield more convincing estimates which 
also suggest that, globally, RTAs generated larger increases in trade among members 
than predicted with cross-section estimates. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The gravity model as an ex-post method to assess regional agreements 
 
2.1 The standard gravity model  
 
Although several models yield a gravity-type equation, in a framework that emphasizes 
aggregate trade, it is convenient to derive the gravity equation from a perfect-
competition H-O type model under the assumption of complete specialization at the 
country level, along with product differentiation at the country level. Assume then 
maximization of a CES utility function (where σ is the common elasticity of 
substitution between any pair of countries’ products, σ>0). As shown in appendix A.1, 



















































































  ∀i,j,h=1..n 
where γh is the share of country h in world income,  i P is the CES price aggregator in 
importer country i and pi is the price in the country of destination i facing consumers. 
Assume now that the relationship between the price in the country of origin j, pj, and the 
country of destination i, pi is given by : 
  (2)      ij ij j i e p p θ =   
  5In (2), eij represents the nominal bilateral exchange rate (defined so that an increase in 
its value corresponds to a depreciation of  i’s currency with respect to j’s currency) and 
θij is a barrier-to-trade function between i and j to be developed below.  
To obtain an estimable model from equation (1), three issues need to be considered. 
First, distance must be measured correctly. Select units of goods so that each country’s 
product price, pj, is normalized to unity (and eij=1). Then, as shown by Deardorff 
(1998),  i P (given by equation A3 in appendix A.1) becomes a “CES index of country i’s 
barriers-to-trade factors” as an importer. Hence, if θij is proxied by distance between i 
and j, DISTij, we have to introduce, in addition to the variable of absolute distance 
between i and j, a variable of average distance of the importing country i from its main 
partners, ( i DIST ) to take account of “the relative distance of i from suppliers” as 
suggested by the theoretical models of Anderson (1979) and Deardorff (1998)
1. 




Second, it is crucial to get the best handle possible on what constitutes the ‘barriers-to-
trade’ function, θij which are usually proxied either by distance, DISTij between trading 
partners (and the presence of a common border or language), or sometimes by the 
cif/fob price ratio
3. Because recent studies have shown that these variables are not the 
                                                           
1  Polak (1996)  emphasizes that if one  doesn’t use a measure of the average distance between a country and its main 
partners as well as absolute distance, one will underestimate trade between faraway countries. 
2 If relative distance is not taken into account, the dummy supposed to reflect trade between members of an 
agreement will capture the bias. 
3  Baier and Bergstrand (2001) use the CIF/FOB ratio to model transport costs, but their study only deals with OECD 
countries which have better data. For a discussion about the problems associated with the use of CIF/FOB data see 
Hummels (1999) and Limao and Venables (2001). 
  6only determinants, we model the barrier-to-trade function, between countries i and j, as 
follows
4 : 
(3)  () () ( ) [ ] j 6 i 5 ij 4 3 2 1 E E L
j i ij ij e IN IN DIST
δ + δ + δ δ δ δ = θ   
with expected signs on coefficients in parenthesis: 
DISTij : distance between the countries i and j (δ1>0);  
Lij : takes the value 1 if i and j share a common border, otherwise 0 (δ4<0); 
Ei(j) : takes the value 1 if the country i (j) is landlocked; otherwise 0 (δ5>0, δ6>0);  
INi (j) : level of infrastructure of the country i (j), computed as an average of the density 
of road, railway and the number of telephone lines per capita (δ2<0, δ3<0).  
 
Third, in a sample with countries that have large differences in income per capita, it is 
customary to abandon the homothetic utility function and allow Engel effects which 
implies including per capita income in the importing country and hence population Ni. 
On the supply side, it is reasonable to assume that supply will be driven by factor 
endowment differences. Following tradition, we use income per capita as proxy so that 
population in the exporting country, Nj is introduced in the model (e.g., Bergstrand, 
1989, Frankel, 1997 or Soloaga and Winters, 2001). 
 
Hence, after taking into account the modifications discussed above, the reduced form of 
the model is, after substitution of (3) in (1): 
 (5)  lnMij = β0 +β1 lnYi +β2 lnYj +β3 lnNi +β4 lnNj +β5 lnDISTij +β6 ln i DIST  +β7 Lij 
+β8 Ei +β9 ln INi+β10 Ej +β11 ln INj +ηij  
where Y
w  is absorbed in the constant term, and with expected signs:  
β1>0, β2>0, β3<0, β4<0, β5=-σ.δ1<0, β6>0, β7=-σ.δ4>0, β8=-σ.δ5<0, β9=-σ.δ2>0,  
                                                           
4 e.g. Limao and Venables (2001). 
  7β10=-σ.δ6<0, β11=-σ.δ3>0, and ηij the error term. 
 
2.2 The gravity model  for ex-post assessment of regional trade agreements 
 
First used by Aitken (1973) as an ex-post assessment for the EEC, the gravity model 
seems well-defined for this issue for two reasons. First, arguably, the model represents a 
relevant counterfactual (or anti-monde) to isolate the effects of an RTA. If the sample of 
countries is appropriately selected, the gravity equation then suggests a “normal” level 
of bilateral trade for the sample. Then, dummy variables can be used to capture the 
“atypical” levels resulting from an RTA.  
Second, thanks to the correct introduction of dummy variables in the model, one can 
isolate trade creation (TC) and trade diversion (TD) effects of an RTA.  
 
In a Vinerian world following an RTA, TC and TD will be reflected in trade flows as 
follows :(i) under pure TC intra-regional trade increases and  imports from the ROW 
remains unchanged; (ii) under pure TD, the increase in intra-regional trade is entirely 
offset by a corresponding decrease of  imports from the ROW; (iii) if there is both TC 
and TD, intra-regional trade increases more than imports from the ROW decrease. 
Because of second-best considerations, identification of TD and TC does not allow 
inference about the welfare consequences of an RTA for members. Finally, for non-
members, because under plausible assumption about the anti-monde a necessary 
condition for their welfare to increase is that the volume of their imports increases once 
the RTA has been established (see Winters, 1997), one should include measure the 
change in volume of exports from members to non-members (an increase signifying an 
improvement in welfare for non-members). 
 
  8Therefore, the correct ex-post assessment of an RTA on the volume of trade should 
include the following dummy variables (associated coefficients in parenthesis)
5 :  
(i) DI (αI) =1 if both partners belong to the same RTA [zero otherwise] (captures intra-
bloc trade); 
(ii) DM (αM) =1 if  importing country i belongs to the RTA and exporting country j, to 
the ROW [zero otherwise] (captures bloc imports from the ROW);  
(iii) DX (αX) =1 if exporting country j belongs to the RTA and importing country i to the 
ROW [zero otherwise] (captures bloc exports to the ROW).  
 
Suppose that αI >0 which corresponds to more intra-bloc trade than predicted by the 
reference (αI<0 corresponding to an RTA between complementary economies) which 
can be in substitution  to domestic production or to exports from the ROW. Hence to 
conclude on whether this corresponds to TC or TD, one needs to examine the signs of 
the coefficients αM and αX. Then, αI>0 along with a lower propensity to import from 
the ROW (αM<0) indicates TD, and if the increase in intra-regional trade is entirely 
offset by a decrease in regional  imports from the ROW, we have pure TD. If intra-
regional trade increases more than imports from the ROW decrease, there is both TC 
and TD. And with αI>0 and αM≥0, there is pure TC. Finally, comparing αI and αX can 
lead to inferences about welfare for non-members. For example, (αI>0,αX<0) would 
indicate a dominant “export diversion” and hence a decrease in welfare for non-
members.  
                                                           
5 This is the specification in  Endoh (1999) and Soloaga and Winters (2001). Others assessing the effects 
of RTAs (e.g., Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997, Frankel, 1997, Krueger, 1999) have not included enough 
dummy variables to distinguish between exports and imports, and hence fail to isolate TD and TC effects. 
 
  9To summarize, following an RTA, [αI>0 and αM≥0 (αX≥0)] indicates pure TC in terms 
of imports (exports) and [αI>0 and αM<0 (αX<0)], indicates TD in terms of imports 
(exports). 
 
3.  Data and estimation 
 
The model is estimated with data for 130 countries over the period 1962-96. Trade data 
are from UN COMTRADE (bilateral imports in current dollars). The dependent variable 
is total bilateral imports and is deflated by a world import price index taken from 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). Data sources for the explanatory variables along 
with data transformations are presented in appendix A.3. Once the missing values are 
taken out
6, the sample covers 130 countries (a list of the countries in the sample is 
presented in appendix A.4). There are thus 240 691 observations for 14 387 pairs of 
countries.  
 
3.1 Panel specification 
 
The usefulness of the gravity model to assess RTAs rests upon a plausible estimation of 
the anti-monde. It has been observed repeatedly (see Polak, 1996, Matyas, 1997, 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997) that regional dummy variables in cross-country 
estimates capture everything specific to the importing or exporting countries not 
captured by the variables included in the equation that influence the level of trade (e.g. 
                                                           
6 The countries which do not declare their imports from a partner or which do not import from this partner are 
identified in the same way, with a missing value. Hence, our data are not censored at zero. The actual number of 
observations (240 691) represent around 50% of potential number. The selection bias which can exist is tested and 
corrected by the inclusion of the selection rule in the model estimation in section 4. 
  10historical, cultural, ethnic, political or geographical factors)
7 which is troublesome since 
the dummy variables should really isolate TD and TC effects. Not taking into account of 
countries’ heterogeneity or of the pair of countries in bilateral trade relations introduces 
a bias. By contrast, a panel data method enables one to identify the specific effects of 
the pair of countries and to isolate them. The inclusion of this bilateral term, αij, specific 
to each pair of countries and common to each year (and different according to the 
direction of trade: αij ≠ αji), is more general than dummies capturing specific elements of 
trade such as common language or cultural similarity (see Cheng and Wall, 1999, Egger 
and Pfaffermayr, 2000). 
 
So the previous model is specified in panel as: 
(6)  lnMijt = α0 + αt + αij +β1 lnYit +β2 lnYjt +β3 lnNit +β4 lnNjt +β5 lnDISTij  
+β6 ln i DIST  +β7 Lij  +β8 Ei +β9 ln INit+β10 Ej +β11 ln INjt  +β12 lnRERijt +η’ijt   
α0 : effect common to all years and pairs of countries (constant); 
αt : effect specific to year t but common to all the pairs of countries
8;  
αij : effect specific to each pair of countries and common to all the years.  
 
Note the introduction of the bilateral real exchange rate (RERijt)
 in (6). In a model with 
panel data that spans a long time period (here 35 years), it is essential to capture the 
evolution of competitiveness. Given our definition of eij in equation (1), an increase of 
the RER reflects a depreciation of the importing country’s currency against that of the 
exporting country which should reduce imports (hence one would expect β12<0). 
                                                           
7 If these factors are also correlated with gravity variables (GDP, populations, distance),  estimations which do not 
include them will have an endogeneity bias, because the omitted variables are correlated with the level of bilateral 
trade and with the explanatory variables (see below). 
8 These time dummies capture common shocks  such as the evolution of oil prices over the period  or Y
w in (1). 
  11 
3.2 Econometric method 
 
Since a fixed effects model is inadequate (the within transformation eliminates time-
invariant variables), bilateral effects are modeled as random variables. Time effects are 
captured by yearly dummies that capture common shocks (e.g. oil price changes). In the 
absence of correlation between the explanatory variables and the specific bilateral 
effects, the GLS estimation provides consistent estimates of the coefficients. However, 
variables like GDP or infrastructure may be correlated with bilateral specific effects
9..  
 
The usual way to deal with this issue is to consider an instrumental variables estimation 
such as that proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) (see appendix A.5 for the 
implementation of this method), though here it is adapted  to the case of an unbalanced 
sample according to the method proposed by Guillotin and Sevestre (1994).  
 
A Hausman-Taylor test of over-identification, based on the comparison of the 
Hausman-Taylor estimator and the Within one, must be carried out (see appendix A.5). 
If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the instruments are legitimate (in the sense of 
no bias due to a correlation between specific bilateral effects and the explanatory 
variables), and the Hausman-Taylor estimator (HT) is the most efficient estimator. 
                                                           
9 The Hausman test (1978)  allows us to control for the presence of correlation between explanatory variables and 
specific bilateral effects. 
  123.3 Endogenity of explanatory variables and sample selection bias 
 
Before proceeding to the evaluation of the effects of RTA (which are, in this section, 
captured by the bilateral specific effect), I check first for endogeneity of explanatory 
variables.
10 Results are reported in table 1. 
 
Column 1 in table 1 reports estimates from the Within equation which treats the 
bilateral specific effects as fixed, thereby giving unbiased parameter estimates for time-
varying variables. All these coefficients are significant at a 99% level and have the 
expected sign. The fit is good (R
2=0.87) and the specific bilateral and time effects 
introduced in the model are strongly significant (as showed by the Fisher tests).  
 
Next come the results from estimating the error component model (GLS) which differ 
markedly from the Within estimation. The Hausman test, based on differences between 
Within and GLS estimators, reveals a χ²7 = 462.07, which is significant at 99%. Hence, 
this test rejects the null hypothesis according to which there would be no correlation 
between the bilateral specific effects and the explanatory variables. The GLS estimator 
is thus biased, and the use of the Hausman-Taylor method justified.  
 
For sensitivity analysis, four regressions are estimated with the Hausman-Taylor 
method. The over-identification test indicates for each regression if the instruments are 
legitimate or if an additional source of correlation between specific effects and 
explanatory variables exists (in the case of a significant test statistic).  
 
                                                           
10 Because the dataset covers a long time span, some series may contain a unit root and thus the estimates in the table 
1 may be spurious. So, a Levine and Lin (1993) unit root test has been applied to the series for GDP, population and 
bilateral import. This test rejects, for all series, the null of a unit root. 
  13Table 1 : Results of the estimates of the gravity equation on panel data. 
   M ijt        
Variables  Within GLS HT I a) HT II b) HT III c)  HT  IV d)
ln Yit  1.03**  0.79** 1.00** 1.10** 1.19**  1.03** 
  (49.8)  (78.4) (60.4) (74.5) (74.4)  (68.4) 
ln Yjt  1.11**  1.12** 1.18** 1.17** 1.13**  1.11** 
  (59.8) (129.8)  (109.4)  (107.0)  (98.4) (80.2) 
ln Nit  0.19** 0.017  -0.088**  0.20**  0.11**  0.20** 
  (5.15) (1.5)  (-6.6)  (8.9) (4.7) (7.7) 
ln Njt  -0.65**  -0.19** -0.25** -0.63** -0.65**  -0.65** 
  (-24.8)  (-17.4) (-19.5) (-24.1) (-24.6)  (-24.6) 
ln DISTij  -  -1.14** -1.17** -1.19** -2.09**  -1.19** 
    (-59.0) (-51.1) (-48.4) (-14.3)  (-45.3) 
ln  i DIST   -  -0.66** 0.26** 1.13** 2.02**  1.10** 
   (-26.4)  (5.1)  (17.1)  (22.2)  (15.8) 
Lij  - 0.68**  1.14**  1.01**  0.77*  1.04** 
   (9.6)  (10.4)  (8.8)  (2.5)  (8.5) 
Ei  - -0.27**  -0.18**  -0.02  -0.10  -0.02 
    (-5.4) (-3.1) (-0.4) (-1.7)  (-0.3) 
Ei  -  -0.47** -0.41** -0.58** -0.59**  -0.56** 
   (-10.4)  (-8.1)  (-11.2)  (-10.6)  (-9.6) 
ln INit  0.04**  0.04** 0.04** 0.05** 0.07**  0.04** 
  (5.3)  (6.3) (6.8) (6.3) (9.9)  (6.0) 
ln INjt  0.03**  0.02** 0.01** 0.03** 0.03**  0.03** 
  (5.9)  (5.6) (3.1) (6.0) (5.9)  (6.5) 
ln RERijt  -0.006** -0.005**  -0.004** -0.006* -0.006** -0.006** 
  (-5.7)  (-3.6) (-2.7) (-4.1) (-4.4)  (-4.2) 
Number of obs (NT)  240 691  240 691  240 691  240 691  240 691  240 691 
Number of bilateral (N)  14 387  14 387  14 387  14 387  14 387  14 387 
R² e)  0.87  0.63 0.62 0.61 0.61  0.63 
Theta  (mean)  -  0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83  0.84 
Bilateral fixed effect  37.09**  -  -  -    - 
  F(14386,226263)       
Time fixed effect  59.97**  161.31** 98.61**  131.58** 144.44**  156.31**
 F(34,226263)  F(34,240644)  F(34,240644)  F(34,240644) F(34,240644)   F(34,240644) 
Hausman test W vs. GLS f)  - 469.07** -  -    - 
chi-2(Kw)    chi-2  (7)       
Hausman test HT vs. GLS g)  - -  961.27** 1184.41** 1480.83**  973.53**
chi-2(K)      chi-2(12) chi-2(12) chi-2(12)  chi-2(12) 
Test of over-identification h)  - -  243.91** 13.21**  110.33**  0.39 
chi-2 (k1-g2)      chi-2(5) chi-2(3) chi-2(1)  chi-2(1) 
** and * significant at 99% and 95% respectively (t-student is presented under the correspondent coefficient). 
The time dummy variables and the constant are not reported in order to save space.  
a) HT I : endogenous variables = lnYit et lnYjt, k1-g2=5. 
b) HT II : endogenous variables = lnYit, lnYjt, lnNit et lnNjt, k1-g2=3. 
c) HT III : endogenous variables =lnYit, lnYjt, lnNit, lnNjt, lnDISTij et ln i DIST , k1-g2=1. 
d) HT IV : endogenous variables = lnYit, lnYjt, lnNit, lnNjt, lnINit et lnINjt, k1-g2=1. 
e) Calculated, for GLS and HT, from [1-Sum of Square Residuals] / [Total Sum of Squares] on the transformed 
model. Note that the impact of random specific effects are not in the R
2 but are part of residuals. 
f) This test is applied to the differences between the Within and GLS estimators, without taking into account the 
coefficients of time effects. If we take them into account, the result is: chi-2(41)= 853.61** 
g) Hausman test applied to the differences between GLS and HT estimators, without time effects.  
h) Hausman test applied to the differences between Within and HT estimators, without time effects.  
Cf. a), b) c) and d) for information on k1-g2. 
  14The first estimation, labeled HT I in table 1, considers only the GDP variables (Yit and 
Yjt) as endogenous. The results point out that these variables are actually correlated with 
the specific effects: the Hausman test, which compares HT I to GLS, confirms that the 
instrumentation has improved the model
11 (the hypothesis of exogeneity of GDP 
variables is rejected). However, the over-identification test rejects the hypothesis 
according to which there would be no more correlation between explanatory variables 
and bilateral effects (χ²5 = 243.91). Hence, only a part of the initial bias has been 
corrected.  
A second source of correlation can come from the population variables. Equation HT II 
takes these two variables (and the GDP variables) as endogenous. The corresponding 
tests for this equation lead us to conclude that once again, the model has been improved 
but the difference with the Within estimation is still significant.  
A third source of endogeneity can be due to the variables of infrastructure
12. Their 
instrumentation, in addition to those of income and population, improves the model and 
the over-identification test indicates that the hypothesis of legitimacy of the instruments 
used cannot be rejected. As the identification condition is verified (see appendix A.5), 
the Hausman-Taylor estimator is convergent and more efficient than the Within 
estimator
13. 
                                                           
11 Guillotin and Sevestre (1994) recommend comparing the HT estimator, denoted βHT, to the GLS estimator, denoted 
βMCQG. It is exactly the same principle as for earlier tests presented in appendix A.5. We compute the Hausman 
statistic test and the number obtained is compared to the critical value of χK
2 (K is the dimension of the coefficients’ 
vector βMCQG). If the null H0 is rejected, we can conclude that the instrumented model gives better estimations then 
the GLS model (without any instrumentation). Thus, the instrumented variables are actually endogenous. 
12 I also test for the correlation of distance variables with bilateral effects in the equation HT III. However this 
equation does not improve the model HT II.  
13 According to the Barghava and al. Durbin Watson test (1982), modified to the unbalanced panel, the HT IV 
residuals are no autocorrelated AR(1): there is no systematic difference between observed and predicted trade flows. 
Hence, the HT IV estimator is efficient and the over-identification test is appropriate (e.g. Egger 2002).  
  15 
All these coefficients are significant at a 99% level (except for Ei) and have the 
expected sign. Import volume of i from j increases with GDP and coefficients are close 
to unity as suggested by the theory and as reported by, for instance, Aitken (1973), 
Soloaga and Winters (2001) and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2000). The population variable 
has the expected negative sign for the exporting country (capturing the fact that larger 
countries trade less) but has a positive sign for the importing country (as in e.g., Soloaga 
and Winters, 2001, and Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2000). The elasticity of bilateral trade to 
distance is superior to unity (-1.19) and the volume of trade increases with the level of 
infrastructure of each country, as in Limao and Venables (2001). Sharing a land border 
allows countries to trade 2.8 times more than expected from the gravity equation 
(=exp(1.04)). Likewise,  imports from a country without direct access to the sea are 
43% lower. Finally, a real depreciation of i with respect to j lowers i’s imports from j. 
 
A last potential estimation bias must  be considered: the unbalanced sample can be 
subject to a non-ignorable selection rule, i.e. that the probability of a pair of countries 
being included in the sample is not independent of model error, and in particular to the 
unobserved bilateral effects. In this case, the selection bias can be tested and corrected 
by the inclusion of the selection rule in the model estimation. I use a method proposed 
by Nijman and Verbeek (1992): which approximates the Heckman correction term
14, by 
adding variables which reflect the individual’s patterns in terms of presence in the 
sample to the model. So HT IV is estimated again including the following additional 
variables: (i) PRES: number of years of presence of the couple ij’s in the sample;(ii) 
                                                           
14 I use an alternative method because the generalization of the Heckman two-steps method (1979) to panel data and 
random effects model is too difficult (Guillotin and Sevestre 1994, p.127). 
  16DD: dummy that takes the value 1 if ij is observed during the entire period, 0 
otherwise;(iii) PAt: dummy that takes the value 1 if ij was present in t-1 (PA0=0). 
 
Results from this estimation are reported in appendix A.6 and are compared to equation 
HT IV (table 1). In the first column, with only the variable PRES considered, the 
conclusions of the previous estimations are not modified, even if the coefficient of 
PRES is statistically different from zero. The following regressions (columns 2 and 3) 
show that the variables DD and PAt have a positive and significant coefficient: all other 
things equal, pairs of countries which have at least two years of consecutive available 
data (and a fortiori if they are present over the entire period) have more bilateral trade 
than pairs of countries with interruption in their data. These three variables will be 
systematically introduced in future regressions, in order to avoid the selection bias in 
the coefficients of regional dummies. 
 
4.  Application to the assessment of the effects of regional trade agreements 
 
Following the specification check, the three dummy variables discussed above were 
introduced in the model to detect TD and TC for a selection of RTAs (EU, ANDEAN, 
NAFTA, CACM, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, EFTA, LAIA).
  To save space, detailed 
comments are only reported for three well-known RTAs: EU, NAFTA, and 
MERCOSUR, the EU being included in spite of lack of data for years prior to the 
agreement because it is the best-known and most studied RTA. Average effects over the 
sample period are reported first, then effects over time to look for break points around 
the important dates of the agreements.  
 
  174.1 Average effects over the period 1962-1996 
 
Table 2 reports the coefficients for dummy variables for two sets of regressions, one in 
cross-section (corresponding to most uses of the gravity model for ex-post assessments 
of RTAs), yielding 35 separate regressions (one for each year), the other with the panel 
specification of section 3. All results are presented in appendix A.7.  
 
Table 2 : Results for regional dummies over 1962-96. 
Mijt 





EUintra 0.291*  -0.215 
EUimports 0.225**  0.797 
EUexports 0.375**  0.746 
MERCOSURintra -0.275  -0.432 
MERCOSURimports -1.041**  0.017 
MERCOSURexports -0.130**  0.088 
NAFTAintra -0.063  0.754 
NAFTAimports -0.478**  0.253 
NAFTAexports 0.009  0.011 
** and * significant at 99% and 95% respectively for Panel estimation. 
a) For each variable, this is the average of the 35 coefficients estimated per year from 1962 to 1996.  
 
Generally, the significance of the coefficients is greater for the panel specification, with 
coefficients of the same sign when they are significant in both specifications. 
These result give the average impact of each RTA over 1962-96. However, relevant 
inferences about TD and TC require inspection of the evolution of these coefficients 
over time and around the period when RTAs go into effect which can be done by 
breaking down estimation into subperiods. To this effect, I break down regional dummy 
variables into two-year periods with these variables introduced in the estimating 
equation instead of the global regional dummies.
15 
                                                           
15 Coefficient estimates for explanatory variables are identical under this procedure because for each 
agreement, the addition of the new variables introduced is equal to the former aggregate dummy variable.  
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4.2 Evolution of the effects during the RA’s existence 
 
Because the results are self-explanatory from inspection of figure 1 to 3, I comment the 
EU results and give only an overall interpretation for NAFTA and MERCOSUR along 
with a summary for other RTAs




Start with the cross-section analysis (figure 1a) for the EU which displays a negative 
trend in intra-EU trade until 1980 before turning positive with the propensity to export 
to the ROW declining over the period suggesting exports TD but no evidence of import-
TD, a result similar to Soloaga and Winters (2001) obtained using the same estimation 
method. 
                                                           
16 The evolution of the estimated coefficients are represented in appendix A.8 for cross-section results and 
for panel ones for the other RTAs. 
17 The consecutive coefficients are tested significantly different.  
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Figure 1: evolution of EU dummies over 1962-1996 (αI, αM and αX) 
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First enlargment  Second enlargment  First enlargment Second enlargment 
 
By contrast, panel estimates (figure 1b) suggest three rather distinct periods in terms of 
TC and TD. From 1967 to 1973, intra-trade decreases somewhat surprisingly without 
clear tendencies for trade with ROW. However, following the first (and second) 
enlargements, the models predicts a significant positive trend in intra-trade (αI increases 
and turns positive in 1984, the pattern continuing with the deep integration following 
the EC-92 programme). In parallel, there is first a stagnation of imports of members 
from the ROW until 1985 and then a negative trend (αM became negative in 1990). 
Hence, the model suggests that, if the first enlargement of the EU (from six to nine 
members in 1974) resulted in a pure TC, the second enlargement (with Spain and 
Portugal in 1986 and subsequent deep integration) presents sign of significant TD, in 
terms of imports and exports. Note however that deep integration in the form of reduced 
technical barriers to trade, even if discriminatory, cannot give rise to welfare reduction 
for RTA members. These results are quite different from Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1997) who found a TD after the first enlargement and TC after the second, but are 
closer to those of Frankel (1997), Krueger (1999) or Soloaga and Winters (2001).  
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Figure 2: evolution of MERCOSUR dummies over 1962-1996 (αI, αM and αX) 
Figure 2a: evolution of the MERCOSUR 
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Figure 2b: evolution of MERCOSUR 

















Figure 3: evolution of NAFTA dummies over 1962-1996 (αI, αM and αX) 
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Comparing the results from both estimation methods is even more striking in the cases 
of MERCOSUR and NAFTA. Here, the cross-section estimates show largely 
unexplainable volatility throughout the time-period whereas the panel estimates capture 
much more clearly the expected effects of an RTA around the time of announcement or 
implementation: an increase in intra-trade and a decrease in imports from the ROW. The 
difference in patterns is particularly striking for NAFTA which reveals largely 
insignificant dummies until the first trade policy reforms in Mexico, and the 
announcement of NAFTA negotiations. As to MERCOSUR, panel estimates capture 
both the increase in intra-trade and the diversion of import from the ROW captured in 
the more disaggregated analysis in Yeats (1998). At the same time, there is some 
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evidence of an increase of the exports for NAFTA and MERCOSUR to the ROW 
(which probably reflects the opening up of the countries to the world as the same time 
as they were forming the RTA). Clearly, the panel estimates reveal a more plausible 
pattern than the cross-section estimates. 
 
This pattern of import (and sometimes export) TD was also found for other RTAs 
reported in appendix A.8. For example, in the case of the ANDEAN accord, the model 
finds import-TD over the period 1969-79, over the period 1962-77 for the CACM, and 
over the period 1968-1980 for the LAIA. Concurrently, over the same period, an export-
TD is observed for the ANDEAN, whereas there is some evidence of an increase of the 
propensity to export towards ROW for CACM. No clear patterns emerged for EFTA, 




This paper has paid particular attention to the specification and the estimation of the 
gravity model to correct for biases present in previous studies. The panel estimation 
with bilateral specific random effects was revealed to be statistically justified after 
correction for endogeneity of the income, size and infrastructure variables. Moreover, 
dummies were introduced to take into account the selection rule of the sample. 
Arguably, these modifications lead to a better formulation of the anti-monde against 
which one assesses the trade performance of RTAs.  
 
Comparison of panel estimates with the more usual cross-section estimates revealed a 
far more plausible pattern of trade effects associated with RTAs as evidenced by 
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examination of three well-studied RTAs: EU, MERCOSUR and NAFTA. In general, 
the results in this study, covering eight RTAs, show that most of them resulted in an 
increase in intra-regional trade beyond levels predicted by the anti-monde reference, 
often coupled with a reduction in imports from the ROW, and at times coupled with a 




A.1 : Derivation of the gravity model  
As in Deardorff (1998), assume each country i is specialized in a single commodity, with a 
representative consumer maximizing a homothetic utility function: 
()1 1
ji j













= ∑       ( A 1 )  
where σ is the common elasticity of substitution between any pair of countries’ products subject 
(σ>0), and bj=bi, ∀i,j guarantees symmetry and a single price for each product variety. Product 
differentiation is at the national level (rather than at the firm level as in the monopolistic 
competition version), and CES preferences (rather than Cobb-Douglas) implies that bilateral 
trade decreases with distance. Each consumer Maximization of (A1) subject to the budget 






























i j i p b P       ( A 3 )  
is the CES price aggregator in country i associated with the minimization of expenditures in the 
utility maximization problem and pi is the price in the country of destination i facing consumers.  
Assume that the relationship between the price in the country of origin j, pj, and the country of 
destination i, pi is given by : 
ij ij j i e p p θ =             ( A 4 )  
In (A4), eij represents the nominal bilateral exchange rate and θij the barrier-to-trade function 
between i and j. This term is usually proxy by the distance between the two countries. 
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To get the standard gravity-based model, assume balanced trade and let γj=Yj/Y
W be the share of 
country j in world income, Y
W. Expenditures of all countries i on the good produced in j are 
. Then, Y ji
i
iC p ∑ j= ji
i






















 γ γ = ∑         ( A 5 )  


















































































 ∀i,j,h=1..n        (A6) 
The intensity of trade between two countries is a function of their respective size and that it is a 
decreasing function of the extent of barriers to trade θij. 
To simplify this, first select units of goods so that each country’s product price, pj, is normalized 
to unity (and eij=1). Then, as shown by Deardorff,  i P  (given by A3) becomes a CES index of 
country i’s barriers-to-trade factors as an importer. Using Deardorff’s notation, the average 
















i b      ( A 7 )  
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  A.2 : Definition of the regional agreements studied     
 UE  EFTA  NAFTA  LAIA  CACM  ANDEAN  MERCO
SUR 
ASEAN
1962 1957(EEC) 1960 1960 (LAFTA) 1960
  France  Austria    Argentina  Costa Rica       
  Germany  Denmark    Bolivia  El Salvador       
  Belgium  Norway    Brazil  Guatemala       
  Italy  Portugal    Chile  Honduras       
  Luxembourg  Sweden    Colombia  Nicaragua       
1964  Netherlands  Switzerland    Ecuador         
    UK    Mexico         
    Finland    Paraguay         
1966        Peru         
        Uruguay        1967 
        Venezuela        Indonesia
1969            1969    Singapore
          Bolivia    Philippines
       
 
  Chile    Malaysia
    1970        Colombia    Thailand
1973  1973(EEC)  Austria        Ecuador     
  France  Iceland(70)        Peru     
1975  Germany  Norway        Venezuela(73)     
  Belgium  Portugal        1976     
  Italy  Sweden        Bolivia     
  Luxembourg  Switzerland        Colombia     
1980  Netherlands  Finland    1980 (LAIA)    Ecuador     
  UK      Argentina    Peru     
  Denmark      Bolivia    Venezuela     
1984  Ireland      Brazil         
  Greece (81)  1985    Chile         
  Spain (86)  Austria    Colombia         
  Portugal (86)  Iceland(70)    Ecuador         
  Austria (95)  Norway    Mexico         
  Finland (95)  Sweden    Paraguay         
  Sweden (95)  Switzerland    Peru         
    Finland    Uruguay         
1991        Venezuela      1991   
              Argentina   
1992      1992        Brazil  1992 
      Canada      1992  Uruguay  Indonesia
    Mexico      Bolivia  Paraguay  Singapore
1994   
 
USA      Colombia    Philippines
            Ecuador    Malaysia
            Venezuela    Thailand
    1995             
    Norway             
    Switzerland             
             
1996   
Liechtenstein 
(91)   
 
       
Bilateral trade of Liechtenstein and Switzerland is not desegregated in this data set (as for Belgium and Luxembourg). 
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A.3 : Sources and data definition 
 
Mijt : COMTRADE, total bilateral imports of country i from country j at time t. This variable is 
in current dollar so it has been divided by an index of the unit value of imports, which is 
taken from IMF, to obtain a real flow of trade.  
Yi(j)t : CD-ROM WDI, World Bank 1999, GDP of country i at time t in constant dollar 1995. 
Ni(j)t : CD-ROM WDI, World Bank 1999, total population of country i at time t. 
DISTij : Data for distance are extracted from the software developed by the company CVN. The 
distance is measured in kilometers between the main city of the country i and that of 
country j. Most of the time, the main city is the capital city, but for some countries the main 
economic city is considered. The distance calculated by this software is orthodromic, that 
is, it takes into account the sphericity of Earth. More precisely, ‘the distance between two 
points A and B is measured by the arc of the circle subtended by the chord [AB]’ (see 
HAINRY, «Jeux Mathématiques et Logiques – Orthodromie et Loxodromie »).  
Lij : Dummy equal to one if the countries i and j share a common land border, 0 otherwise. 
Ei(j) : Dummy equal to one if the country i is landlocked (i.e. do not have a direct access to the 
sea), 0 otherwise. 
INi(j)t : This index is built using 4 variables from the database constructed by Canning (1996): 
the number of kilometer of roads, of paved roads, of railways, and the number of telephone 
sets/lines per capita of country i (j) at time t. The first three variables are divided by the land 
area (WB, 1999) to obtain a density. Thus, each variable obtained is normalized to have a 
same mean equal to one. An arithmetic average is then calculated over the four variables, 
for each country and each year, without taking into account the missing values (a similar 
computation is presented by Limao and Venables 2001). As the final year of the data set is 
1995, an extrapolation had to be made to cover the year 1996.  
i DIST  : average distance of country i to exporter partners, weighted by exporters’ GDP share in 
world GDP (“remoteness” of country i). The ten main trade partners are identified for each 
country according to bilateral flows averaged over 1980-96 (in COMTRADE). For the 
weights, we used 1990’s GDP (WB, 1999). Hence, This variable is specific to each country 
and is not time variant. 
RERijt : We extract from the IFS data set the nominal exchange rate for each country against 
US dollar (NERi/$, country i’s currency value of 1 US$), and the consumption price index for 
country i (CPIi), for each year from 1962 to 1996. If the CPI is not available for a country, 
we consider the GDP deflator of the country. The bilateral real exchange rate (RER) is 
computed as following: RER i/j = (CPIj) / (CPIi) . (NERi/$ / NERj/$ ), where i is the importing 
country and j the exporting one. For each pair of countries, we specify the RER such as its 
mean over the period is zero.  
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A.4 : Countries in the sample. 
OECD  Sub-Saharan       
Africa  
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  
Asia and the 
Pacific 
Others 
Australia Angola Argentina Bangladesh Albania
Austria South  Africa*  Bahamas  Brunei  Armenia 
Burundi Barbados  Bhutan  Azerbaijan  Belgium + 
Luxembourg  Benin Belize  China  Bulgaria 
Canada Burkina  Faso  Bolivia  Fiji  Belarus 
Germany  Central African Rep.  Brazil  Hong Kong  Czech Rep. 
Denmark Ivory  Coast  Chile  Indonesia  Algeria 
Spain Cameroon Colombia  India  Saudi  Arabia 
Finland Congo  Costa  Rica  Cambodia  Egypt 
France  Comoros  Dominican Rep.  Lao PDR  Estonia 
United Kingdom  Cape Verde  Dominica  Macao  Georgia 
Ireland Djibouti  Ecuador  Mongolia  Greece 
Iceland  Ethiopia + Eritrea  Grenada  Malaysia 
Italy Gabon  Guatemala  Nepal 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Japan Ghana  Guyana  Pakistan  Hungary 
Korea, Rep.  Guinea  Honduras  Philippines  Iran 
United States  Guinea-Bissau  Haiti  Papua New Guinea Israel 
Netherlands Gambia  Jamaica  Singapore  Jordan 
Norway  Equatorial Guinea  Mexico  Salomon Islands  Kazakstan 
New Zealand  Kenya  Nicaragua  Thailand  Kyrgyz Rep. 
Portugal Madagascar  Panama  Vietnam  Kuwait 
Sweden Mali  Peru  Western Samoa  Lithuania 
Mozambique Paraguay Sri  Lanka Latvia  Switzerland + 
Liechtenstein  Mauritania El  Salvador  Tonga Macedonia 
 Mauritius  Suriname  Kiribati  Morocco 
  Malawi  Trinidad and Tobago Vanuatu  Malta 
 Niger  Uruguay    Oman 
  Nigeria  St. Vincent and    Poland 
  Rwanda  The Grenadines    Romania 
 Sudan  Venezuela    Russian Federation 
 Senegal  St. Lucia   Slovenia 
  Sierra Leone  Antigua and    Slovak  Rep. 
  Sao Tomé and Principe  Barbuda   Syrian  Rep. 
  Seychelles  St. Kitts and    Tajikistan 
  Somalia Nevis    Turkmenistan 
 Chad      Tunisia 
 Togo      Turkey 
 Tanzania     Ukraine 
 Uganda      Uzbekistan 
 Zaire       
 Zambia       
 Zimbabwe       
Countries written in italic are not available as reporter countries in COMTRADE (only as partners).  
* South Africa includes bilateral trade of the group of countries: South Africa + Lesotho + Botswana + Namibia + 
Swaziland. 
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A.5: the Hausman and Taylor (1981) method. 
Let us consider: 
Mijt= Xijtβ + Zijδ+ uijt   with uijt = αij + νijt                                              (A.9) 
With Xijt = [lnYit lnYjt lnNit lnNjt lnINit lnINjt lnRERijt]  
and Zij= [lnDISTij ln i DIST  Lij Ei Ej] 
where some explanatory variables of X (variables variant over time) and of Z (time-invariant 
variables) are correlated with the specific effects. We suppose that among the variables X and Z, 
there exist: 
(i) Xijt: k1 (k2) exogenous (endogenous) variables, denoted X1 (X2); 
(ii) Zij: g1 (g2) exogenous (endogenous) variables, denoted Z1 (Z2); 
If the condition k1 ≥ g2 is satisfied, then the equation is identified
18 and (A.9) can be estimated 
using [QX1, QX2, PX1, Z1]
19 as instruments (see Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt, 1989). The 
instruments are then taken within the model. The resulting estimator is consistent but not 
efficient, as it does not correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation due to the presence 
of random bilateral specific effects. Hence, Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest using this first 
round of estimates to compute the variance of the specific effect (σµ²) and the variance of the 
error term (σν²). The instrumental variable estimator is then applied to the following transformed 
equation: 
Yijt – (1-θ) Yij. = [ Xijt – (1-θ)Xij. ] β + θZijδ + θµij + [νijt –(1-θ) νij.]  
With
20 θ= ( σν
2 / Tσµ
2 + σν
                                                          
2)
1/2                                                            (A.10) 
A test of over-identification must be carried out. It is based on the comparison of the Hausman-
Taylor estimator, denoted βHT, and the Within estimator (fixed effects model), denoted βw. The 
Hausman test statistic is: 
[βHT - βW] . [var(βHT) - var(βW)]
-1 . [βHT - βW]’      (A.11) 
Under the null hypothesis, this test statistic is distributed as a Chi-square (χ
2) with k1-g2 degrees 
of freedom. If the statistic is inferior to the critical value, then the null can’t be rejected: the 
instruments are legitimate
21. If k1 > g2, we can also conclude that the Hausman-Taylor estimator 
(HT) is the most efficient estimator. 
 
18 If k1 > g2 then the equation is over-identified. 
19 Q is the matrix that computes the deviations from individual means. P is the matrix that computes the observation 
across time for each individual (pair of countries).  







are corrected for the bias of heteroskedasticity, specific to the unbalanced sample, according to the method proposed 
by Guillotin and Sevestre (1994). The mean value of θij will be systematically presented in the tables of results. 
21 Actually, the null hypothesis H0 is that there are no significant difference between the Within estimator and the HT 
one. So, under H0, there is no longer bias due to a correlation between specific bilateral effects and explanatory 
variables. 
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ln Yit 1.00**  1.06**  0.98** 
 (61.1)  (65.0)  (60.8) 
ln Yjt 1.13**  1.15**  1.14** 
 (77.1)  (76.9)  (89.5) 
ln Nit 0.16**  0.19**  0.16** 
 (6.4)  (7.3)  (6.2) 
ln Njt -0.64**  -0.69**  -0.62** 
 (-21.4)  (-26.1)  (-22.8) 
ln DISTij -1.09**  -1.14**  -1.17** 
 (-44.8)  (-43.8)  (-43.9) 
ln  i DIST   0.96** 1.17** 0.60** 
 (14.3)  (17.0)  (8.7) 
Lij 0.97**  1.04**  0.90** 
 (8.8)  (8.7)  (7.2) 
Ei -0.17  -0.05  -0.14* 
 (-5.2)  (-0.8)  (-2.3) 
Ej -0.54**  -0.52**  -0.51** 
 (-6.4)  (-9.1)  (-4.9) 
ln INit 0.04**  0.04**  0.04** 
 (5.1)  (5.6)  (4.6) 
ln INjt 0.03**  0.03**  0.03** 
 (7.3)  (6.6)  (7.1) 
ln RERijt -0.006**  -0.006**  -0.005** 
 (-4.1)  (-4.3)  (-3.1) 
PRES 0.05**  -  0.039** 
 (29.2)    (18.5) 
DD -  0.84**  0.10 
   (13.5)  (1.5) 
PAt -    0.49** 
     (49.4) 
Number of obs (NT)  240 691  240 691  240 691 
Number of bilateral (N)  14 387  14 387  14 387 
R²   0.63 0.64 0.65 
Theta (mean)  0.83 0.84 0.85 
** and * significant at 99% and 95% respectively ( t-student is presented under the correspondent coefficient). 
The time dummy variables and the constant are not reported in order to save space.  
The estimation method is one of Hausman-Taylor, with variables Yit, Yjt, Nit, Njt, INit and INjt as endogenous (HT IV). 
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A.7 : Results of the estimation with regional dummies (1962-1996). 
Mijt 
Panel  Cross-section   Variables 
Coeff. t  Average  Coeff. max  min 
ln Yit 1 033** 62.66  0 769 0.97 0.63 
ln Yjt 1.139**  85.15  0.935  1.21 0.69 
ln Nit 0.131**  11.38  -0.045  -0.01 -0.12 
ln Njt -0.650**  -22.69  -0.082  -0.01 -0.20 
ln DISTij -1.168**  -41.93  -0.971  -0.46 -1.25 
ln  i DIST   0.751**  16.11  0.136  0.65 -0.71 
Lij 0.921**  7.68  1.018  1.58 0.54 
Ei -0.161**  -3.66  -0.178  -0.01 -0.63 
Ej -0.510*  -2.09  -0.389  -0.05 -1.07 
ln INit 0.037**  4.68  0.157  0.26 0.07 
ln INjt 0.031**  7.19  0.067  0.14 0.01 
ln RERijt -0.005**  -4.12  -  - - 
PRES 0.039**  19.21  - - - 
DD 0.099  0.31  -  - - 
PAt 0.494**  49.4  -  - - 
EU intra 0.291*  1.98  -0.215 0.58 -0.88 
EU imports 0.225**  3.16  0.797  1.04 0.04 
EU exports 0.375**  5.11  0.746  1.53 0.02 
EFTA intra -0.287  -1.56  0.319 0.77 -0.10 
EFTA imports -0.075  -0.89  -0.098  0.12 -0.55 
EFTA exports -0.932**  -11.93  -0.007  0.37 -0.21 
ASEAN intra 0.680**  4.18  1.757 2.78 1.22 
ASEAN imports -0.513**  -5.77  0.458  0.96 0.01 
ASEAN exports 0.757**  8.86  0.421  1.15 -0.25 
ANDEAN intra 0.772**  4.78  1.049 2.65 -0.25 
ANDEAN imports -0.940**  -5.07  0.285  1.2 -0.64 
ANDEAN exports -0.959**  -6.08  -0.022  1.79 -1.37 
MERCOSUR intra -0.275  1.54  -0.432 1.01 -1.68 
MERCOSUR imports -1.041**  -6.76  0.017  0.57 -0.63 
MERCOSUR exports -0.130  0.93  0.088  1.06 -1.02 
LAIA intra a) 0.360**  4.62  0.327 1.2 -0.77 
LAIA imports -1.492**  -12.23  -1.073  -0.48 -1.92 
LAIA exports -0.357  1.41  -0.359  0.88 -1.23 
CACM intra 1.087**  3.91  2.305 3.44 1.19 
CACM imports -0.776**  -8.30  -0.498  0.06 -0.88 
CACM exports -0.127  -1.34  -0.097  0.28 -0.79 
NAFTA intra -0.063  -0.48  0.754 2.18 -0.30 
NAFTA imports -0.478**  -5.96  0.253  0.68 -0.21 
NAFTA exports 0.009  0.07  0.011  0.76 -0.65 
Number of obs (NT) 240 691  7 265 9 362  5 819 
Number of bilateral (N)  14 387  -  - - 
R²   0.66  0.64  0.73 0.60 
Theta (mean)  0.84  -  - - 
** and * significant at 99% and 95% respectively ( t-student is presented next to correspondent coefficient). 
a) As all the members of ANDEAN and MERCOSUR belong also to LAIA, we isolate the evolution of trade of the 
two former RTA in computing the dummies for LAIA as follows (i.e. Soloaga and Winters (2001)) : 
intra-LAIA=LAIA-ANDEAN-MERCOSUR 
LAIA imports= LAIA imports-ANDEAN imports-MERCOSUR imports 
LAIA exports= LAIA exports-ANDEAN exports-MERCOSUR exports. 
  32 
  
A.8 : Evolution of the RTA dummies estimated in panel and in cross-section over 1962-
1996 (αI, αM and αX).  
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